装配式建筑从设计到生产再到装配的施工方式使产业链拉长，供应链中涌现了预制构件生产商等新型参与主体。预制构件生产、运输、装配过程中涉及单位众多且关系复杂，质量信息披露、传递、共享受阻，易出现质量信息孤岛，显著影响工程质量。因此， 这一新型建造模式对供应链主体提出了更为迫切和高效的质量信息披露需求。本文旨在探讨在区块链技术背景下，如何有效实现装配式建筑供应链的高水平质量信息披露，以期对现阶段装配式建筑的持续健康发展提供重要启示和策略支持。

首先，深入剖析了当前装配式建筑供应链质量信息披露现状，进而探讨了区块链在装配式建筑供应链质量信息披露中的潜在应用优势。基于以上分析，构建装配式建筑供应链质量信息披露演化博弈模型，分析了装配式建筑供应链质量信息披露系统均衡点。结果表明，区块链技术具备良好的适用性及潜力，可应用于装配式建筑供应链的质量信息披露领域。但装配建筑供应链质量信息披露活动中何时采用区块链技术、供应链节点如何决策自身质量信息披露水平需要进一步研究。
其次，运用 Stackelberg 博弈理论研究了在一般/基于区块链的质量信息披露方式下，构件生产商和施工单位的最优决策，具体分析了区块链技术的采纳条件，并通过matlab 数值仿真分析了质量信息感知系数、风险规避水平、平台佣金、区块链成本对构件生产商和施工单位之间战略互动的影响。研究发现，供应链双方之间存在矛盾，区块链实施易遭遇瓶颈。
最后，从供应链内部协调、外部激励和外部监督三个方面出发，设计了基于区块链的装配式建筑供应链质量信息披露的成本共担契约、政府补贴激励、社会监督评价机制，利用 Stackelberg 博弈理论分析了不同激励机制下构件生产商和施工单位最优决策，并进行了数值仿真。研究发现，三种激励机制均能起到一定的激励作用，且成本共担契约和社会监督评价机制作用较明显。 研究结果为基于区块链的装配式建筑供应链质量信息披露及装配式建筑的可持续发展提供了科学指导。

关键词：装配式建筑；建筑供应链；区块链；质量信息披露；主从博弈

As the concept of sustainable development in the construction industry has become increasingly prominent, the continuous advancement of new building industrialization has brought prefabricated buildings into the spotlight, making significant contributions to the transformation and upgrading of the construction industry and the improvement of construction efficiency. However, the construction mode of prefabricated buildings, from design to assembly, extends the industry chain, and new participants such as prefabricated component manufacturers emerge in the supply chain. This expansion has resulted in a intricate web of units involved in the production, transportation, and assembly of prefabricated components, leading to complexities in the relationships among them. Consequently, the disclosure, dissemination, and sharing of quality information are hindered, giving rise to the formation of quality information silos, which in turn, has a profound impact on project quality. Therefore, this new construction model necessitates a more urgent and efficient demand for quality information sharing among entities within supply chain. This study aims to explore how to effectively achieve quality information sharing in the prefabricated buildings supply chain based on blockchain, offering profound insights and strategic directives for the sustainable development of prefabricated buildings at this juncture.
Firstly, the current landscape of quality information sharing in the supply chain of prefabricated buildings was analyzed, and the potential application benefits of blockchain in quality information disclosure in the assembly building supply chain were explored. Based on the analysis, an evolutionary game model for quality information disclosure was established. The objective of this model was to thoroughly investigate the equilibrium states of the quality information disclosure system and the application of blockchain technology for enhancing quality information disclosure in prefabricated building supply chains. The findings revealed the applicability and potential of blockchain technology in quality information disclosure within the supply chain. However, when to adopt blockchain technology in prefabricated building supply chain quality information disclosure activities and how supply chain parties make decisions about their quality information disclosure levels needed further research.

Secondly, utilizing Stackelberg game theory, this thesis investigated the optimal decisions of component manufacturers and construction units in the procurement process of prefabricated buildings supply chain. The analysis compared two scenarios: one relying traditional quality information sharing and the other leveraging blockchain technology. The conditions for blockchain technology adoption were analyzed. To evaluate the influence of various factors, such as quality information perception coefficients, risk aversion levels, platform commissions, and blockchain costs, MATLAB numerical simulations were conducted. The findings revealed that the cost of disclosing quality information under blockchain hinders component manufacturers' willingness to disclose, leading to conflicts among supply chain parties, potentially obstructing blockchain implementation. This can create bottlenecks in the implementation of blockchain. To mitigate this conflict and achieve supply chain coordination, effective incentive mechanisms were proposed.
Finally, this thesis introduced a cost-sharing contract, a government subsidy incentives mechanism, and a social supervision evaluation mechanism for quality information sharing within the supply chain of prefabricated buildings under blockchain. These mechanisms were designed to strengthen internal supply chain coordination, external incentives, and external supervision. Utilizing Stackelberg game theory, the study analyzed the optimal decisions of component manufacturers and construction units under different incentive mechanisms. MATLAB numerical simulations were conducted to assess the impact of these incentive mechanisms on key variables and their potential for optimizing the supply chain. The findings indicated that all three mechanisms exhibit significant motivating effects, with the cost-sharing contract and social supervision evaluation mechanism proving particularly. In practical projects, it is crucial to select an appropriate incentive mechanism or combine multiple mechanisms based on the specific context.