As the concept of sustainable development in the construction industry has become increasingly prominent, the continuous advancement of new building industrialization has brought prefabricated buildings into the spotlight, making significant contributions to the transformation and upgrading of the construction industry and the improvement of construction efficiency. However, the construction mode of prefabricated buildings, from design to assembly, extends the industry chain, and new participants such as prefabricated component manufacturers emerge in the supply chain. This expansion has resulted in a intricate web of units involved in the production, transportation, and assembly of prefabricated components, leading to complexities in the relationships among them. Consequently, the disclosure, dissemination, and sharing of quality information are hindered, giving rise to the formation of quality information silos, which in turn, has a profound impact on project quality. Therefore, this new construction model necessitates a more urgent and efficient demand for quality information sharing among entities within supply chain. This study aims to explore how to effectively achieve quality information sharing in the prefabricated buildings supply chain based on blockchain, offering profound insights and strategic directives for the sustainable development of prefabricated buildings at this juncture.
Firstly, the current landscape of quality information sharing in the supply chain of prefabricated buildings was analyzed, and the potential application benefits of blockchain in quality information disclosure in the assembly building supply chain were explored. Based on the analysis, an evolutionary game model for quality information disclosure was established. The objective of this model was to thoroughly investigate the equilibrium states of the quality information disclosure system and the application of blockchain technology for enhancing quality information disclosure in prefabricated building supply chains. The findings revealed the applicability and potential of blockchain technology in quality information disclosure within the supply chain. However, when to adopt blockchain technology in prefabricated building supply chain quality information disclosure activities and how supply chain parties make decisions about their quality information disclosure levels needed further research.

Secondly, utilizing Stackelberg game theory, this thesis investigated the optimal decisions of component manufacturers and construction units in the procurement process of prefabricated buildings supply chain. The analysis compared two scenarios: one relying traditional quality information sharing and the other leveraging blockchain technology. The conditions for blockchain technology adoption were analyzed. To evaluate the influence of various factors, such as quality information perception coefficients, risk aversion levels, platform commissions, and blockchain costs, MATLAB numerical simulations were conducted. The findings revealed that the cost of disclosing quality information under blockchain hinders component manufacturers' willingness to disclose, leading to conflicts among supply chain parties, potentially obstructing blockchain implementation. This can create bottlenecks in the implementation of blockchain. To mitigate this conflict and achieve supply chain coordination, effective incentive mechanisms were proposed.
Finally, this thesis introduced a cost-sharing contract, a government subsidy incentives mechanism, and a social supervision evaluation mechanism for quality information sharing within the supply chain of prefabricated buildings under blockchain. These mechanisms were designed to strengthen internal supply chain coordination, external incentives, and external supervision. Utilizing Stackelberg game theory, the study analyzed the optimal decisions of component manufacturers and construction units under different incentive mechanisms. MATLAB numerical simulations were conducted to assess the impact of these incentive mechanisms on key variables and their potential for optimizing the supply chain. The findings indicated that all three mechanisms exhibit significant motivating effects, with the cost-sharing contract and social supervision evaluation mechanism proving particularly. In practical projects, it is crucial to select an appropriate incentive mechanism or combine multiple mechanisms based on the specific context.