超低能耗建筑激励机制研究

张 楠

摘要

当前，我国建筑能耗形势严峻，几乎占社会总能耗的30%左右。在建筑能耗不断增长的现实情况下，不论是从经济发展角度还是国际责任角度，即刻开始推广可有效降低建筑能耗的超低能耗建筑已刻不容缓。由于我国超低能耗建筑起步晚、发展地区不均匀，目前仍处于技术示范和推广阶段，其具有的经济外部性使得政府激励的重要性不言而喻。

本文通过对超低能耗建筑发展和政策现状进行梳理，在考虑建筑全生命周期的基础上，分析政府需要采取的激励方式和开发商建设超低能耗建筑的成本收益组成，根据政府与房地产开发商之间的博弈关系建立数学模型，计算均衡点并判断其稳定性，对政府的激励方式和激励强度提出建议。最后，结合激励机制模型的演化博弈仿真方法对超低能耗建筑在湖北省推广的前景进行实证分析，有针对性地、定量地提出湖北省发展超低能耗建筑的激励政策建议。

研究得出，湖北省政府应对建设超低能耗建筑的开发商进行一定比例的增量成本补贴，此外还可增加容积率奖励和商品房的价格补贴等更为丰富的激励方式。其次，为了维持超低能耗建筑的持续运行，建议由开发商承担在超低能耗建筑生命周期成本中一定比例的维修替换成本。政府还可通过加强相关产品和技术的研发、推动产业链发展来降低超低能耗建筑的建设成本。最后，政府应完善超低能耗建筑政策法规体系、强化监管体系，加大试点范围、加强推广力度，从而推进超低能耗建筑在湖北省的发展。

关键词：建筑能耗；超低能耗建筑；被动房；激励机制；演化博弈

Abstract

In recent years, China's social energy consumption situation is severe, and the building energy consumption has accounted for nearly one third of the total social energy consumption.

Under the realistic situation that building energy consumption is increasing year by year, it is urgent to start promoting ultra-low energy consumption buildings that can effectively reduce building energy consumption from the perspective of economic development and international responsibility.

Due to the late start of ultra-low energy consumption buildings in China and uneven development areas, they are still in the stage of technology demonstration and promotion, and their economic externalities make the importance of government incentives self-evident.

Based on low energy consumption building, the present situation and problems of development and policy on the basis of considering the lifecycle of the building, analysis of the incentives of the government needs to take and developers to build low cost benefit of building energy consumption, build a game model between government and developers, stable equilibrium calculation, puts forward Suggestions for the government's incentive intensity.

Finally, combining with the evolutionary game simulation method of the incentive mechanism model, this paper makes an empirical analysis on the prospect of the promotion of ultra-low-energy buildings in hubei province, and puts forward some Suggestions on the incentive policies for the development of ultra-low-energy buildings in hubei province.

The results show that the government of hubei province should subsidize the incremental cost of building developers with a certain proportion of ultra-low energy consumption buildings. In addition, it can also increase the plot ratio incentive and the price subsidy of commercial housing.

Secondly, in order to maintain the continuous operation of ultra-low-energy buildings, it is suggested that the developer bear a certain proportion of the maintenance and replacement cost in the life cycle cost of ultra-low-energy buildings.

The government can also reduce the cost of building ultra-low-energy buildings by strengthening research and development of related products and technologies and promoting industrial chain development.

Finally, the government should improve the system of policies and regulations on ultra-low-energy buildings, strengthen the supervision system, expand the scope of pilot projects and strengthen the promotion, so as to promote the development of ultra-low-energy buildings in hubei province.

Keywords: Building Energy Consumption, Ultra-low-energy Building, Passive House, Incentive Mechanism, Evolutionary Game