房地产企业房建项目第三方安全巡查管理研究
郭林飞
摘 要
随着我国经济的高速发展、城市化进程加快,社会对商品住宅的需求量逐步增长,不但推动了我国房地产业的迅猛发展,而且催生了大型房地产企业的兴起。然而,建筑行业安全管理水平的发展却不适应房地产行业扩张的需要,根据近年我国建筑安全事故统计结果显示,安全生产的整体态势还是较为严峻。对于大型房地产企业来说,现有的安全监督管理体系存在一定局限性,监管过程中出现的外部监督效率低、内部监管不到位等问题严重制约着企业安全管理水平的提升。然而,由业主自行组建独立、专业的安全管理团队并不符合企业发展的经济效益追求,通过购买第三方服务以提高项目安全管理效率成为了市场的必然选择。因此,本文结合某地产投资集团的第三方安全巡查实际项目,对第三方安全巡查管理的必要性、巡查工作模式及巡查具体内容等进行了较为深入的研究。
首先,本文通过文献阅读,总结归纳了房建工程安全管理现状及存在的主要问题,界定了第三方安全巡查的相关概念,从第三方管理理论角度分析了第三方安全巡查的可行性;在可行性基础上,从安全成本投入角度分析了其经济性,并运用博弈论理论建立建筑工程安全管理中的监管博弈模型及有第三方巡查机构参与的三方寻租博弈模型,说明了长期监管博弈过程中监理方和施工方混合策略的平衡状态困局可以通过第三方的参与来改变,证明了业主方购买第三方安全巡查服务的有效性,从经济性、有效性两个维度阐述了业主方采用第三方安全巡查模式的必要性。其次,对比分析了现有巡查模式的优劣与适用范围,研究并提出了第三方安全巡查的巡查方案、工作流程及具体开展的原则、方式等;从国家政策、地方法规、公司合约角度,结合近年安全事故的统计情况,通过专家咨询等方式确定了第三方安全巡查的具体内容。最后,结合作者参与过的某地产集团的第三方安全巡查实践案例,对巡查内容、工作模式等进一步总结优化,同时巡查结果也验证了第三方安全巡查的有效性。
论文总结分析了第三方安全巡查的理论依据,提出了第三方安全巡查的具体开展模式,确定了房建工程第三方安全巡查的内容,通过实证分析进一步验证了其存在的有效性,为业主方开展第三方安全巡查工作提供借鉴,具有一定理论意义和实践价值。
关键词:房建工程;第三方巡查;安全巡查模式;博弈论
Abstract
With the rapid economic development and the accelerated urbanization in China, the social demand for commercial housing has gradually increased, which not only promoted the rapid development of Chinese real estate industry, but also spawned the rise of large-scale real estate enterprises. However, the unsatisfied safety management level of construction projects can not meet the demands of the explosive real estate industry. According to the statistical results about construction safety accidents in China in recent years, the overall situation of safety production is still challenging. Large-scale real estate enterprises are influenced by the existing safety supervision and management system, and it is difficult to improve the safety management level of enterprise due to the low external supervision efficiency and inadequate internal supervision in the supervision process. Yet the establishment of an independent and professional safety management team by the owner alone is not in line with the pursuit of economic benefits for enterprise development. Herein, to improve the efficiency of project safety management, the owner has no choice but purchase third-party services in the market. Therefore, in this work, in-depth research has been conducted on the necessity of third-party inspections management, specific implementation methods and contents of inspections, which based on the actual third-party safety inspections project of certain real estate enterprises.
First of all, this paper summarizes the current status and major problems of the safety management of building construction engineering by reading literatures. Besides, the relevant concepts of third-party safety inspections are defined, and the feasibility of third-party safety inspections is analyzed from the perspective of third-party theory. On the basis of feasibility, its economic applicability is discussed through investing knowledge in safety cost. Moreover, game theory is used to establish a supervision game model in construction safety management, and a three-party rent-seeking game model with the participation of third-party safety inspections is also utilized. It shows that, during the long-term supervision game, the dilemma of balanced state of the mixed strategy between the supervisor and the constructor can be changed through the participation of third parties, which proves the effectiveness of third-party safety inspection services purchased by the owner. From the perspectives of economic applicability, and effectiveness above, it is necessary for the owner to adopt the third-party safety inspection mode. Secondly, this work compares the pros and cons of the existing inspection mode and these scopes of application, and makes detailed analysis. In addition, we propose the program, workflow and specific implementation methods of third-party safety inspection. Besides, the specific contents of third-party safety inspections are studied through expert consultation and other means after considering the factors of national policies, local regulations, company contract perspectives, combined with the statistics of safety incidents in recent years. Finally, combined with the third-party safety inspection practice case of certain real estate enterprises that the author has participated in, the inspection content and working mode are further summarized and optimized. The inspection results also verified the effectiveness of the third-party safety inspection.
This paper analyzes the theoretical basis of the third-party safety inspection, clarifies the specific mode and contents of the third-party safety inspection of the building construction engineering, and verifies the validity of its existence through empirical analysis. Furthermore, it also provides reference for other owners to perform third-party safety inspection which has certain theoretical significance and practical value.
Keywords: Building Construction Engineering; Third-party Inspection; Safety Inspection Mode; Game Theory