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摘 要

安全监管是降低工程建设安全风险失控引起的事故损失和落实各项安全政策的重要手段和措施，建设过程中各方利益诉求不同且相互影响，使得安全监管问题具备复杂系统和动态变化的特性，给监管长期效果的预测和控制带来了困难。目前研究主要在于讨论了有两个参与方的博弈演化稳定策略的存在性和对控制策略的分析，而针对工程建设过程中存在有不同类型参建方的实际情况，现有文献缺乏不同关系条件下的多方博弈研究。有鉴于此，本文尝试以控制策略优化研究为导向，分析安全监管部门与主要参建单位之间监管博弈的动态演化过程。

本文从安全监管部门与参建单位之间的多方博弈关系入手，将动态演化思想与基于系统动力学的计算机仿真手段相结合，构建了不同的策略分析平台，对监管控制策略进行了优化研究，并结合具体工程对理论分析成果进行了实际应用。

首先，本文建立了监管部门与不同类型参建单位之间的多方博弈系统动力学仿真模型，仿真结果显示经过多次博弈后系统未能达到纳什均衡；引入信息延迟假设时将使博弈过程的动态振荡幅度加大，进一步增加了安全监管的难度；提出了级差监管策略，并通过仿真分析验证了对模型动态稳定的作用。

其次，基于有限理性条件下构建了安全监管多方演化博弈模型，引入复制动态方程描述各方策略变化模式；通过仿真和理论分析验证了动态惩罚策略条件下多方演化稳定均衡的存在。

再次，分析了同类型非合作关系下多参建单位的安全监管博弈动态演化过程；指出惩罚系数 k 的设定对控制违规建设行为的作用；分析了静态惩罚策略和动态惩罚策略的控制效果和不同违规获益单位的风险偏好。

然后，以策略优化为目标，构建了安监部门与不同类型参建单位的微分博弈模型；指出了优化控制策略应考虑监管部门的策略选择；给出了多方博弈均衡解并进行了仿真分析和理论证明。

最后，结合一具体案例介绍了监管机制设计和应用的过程；提出了采用有针对性的安全检查表的方式来获取工程建设安全信息，并依据理论分析结果提出了适用的安全监管奖惩办法；通过实施效果分析，证明了合理的监管制度将有助于提高工程建设的安全控制水平。

关键词：建设安全；监管博弈；控制策略；动态性分析；演化稳定均衡；多方演化博弈

Abstract

Safety regulation is the important meansand measures to reduce the risk of the uncontrollable situation duringconstruction and to ensure the performance of safety policies. In the processof construction, different interests of dissimilar parties and the mutualinfluence make the safety regulatory issues with the characteristics of complexsystems and dynamic changes, which also make it difficult to predict andcontrol of the long-term regulatory effects. The recent studies on applicationmainly focus on the existence of evolutionary stable strategies and analysis ofcontrol strategies based on the two-person game. While during the constructionprocess, there are different types of participant, the existing literature lackof research on the multi-game under the conditions of different relations.Thus, the objective of this thesis is to investigate the dynamic procedure ofregulation multi-game between the authority and main construction participantsand to optimize the control strategy.

This thesis starts with the analysis ofrelationship of safety authority and construction participants in theregulation game. The dynamic evolution methodology combined with SystemDynamics (SD) are used to build different strategy analysis platform andoptimize the regulation polices. The theoretical analysis results are also usedin specific engineering project.

In particular, this thesis firstly developsa System Dynamic multi-game model between the authority, contractor andengineer, without or with the consideration of information delay. Thestimulation result shows after a long time, all the game players can not reachthe Nash equilibrium. For the case with information delay, the dynamicoscillation amplitude will increase,

which makes the safety regulation moredifficult. A differential regulatory strategy is proposed to deal with theunreachable Nash equilibrium and is vestified its dynamic stable effect for themodel by the stimulation result.

Subsequently, considering the boundedrationality of decision-makers, the construction safety regulation dynamicevolutionary multi-game model is investigated. Raplication dynamic equation isintroduced to descript the changes of different game parties’ strategy choices.Theory analysis and computer simulation validate the existence of evolutionarystable strategy with the application of dynamic penalty policy.

This thesis further analyzes the dynamicprocedure of regulation game considering the non-coopration relationshipsbetween the construction participants. The effect of the setting of penaltyfactor k in controlling the violation actives is investigated. Both the controleffects of static and dynamic penalties are analyzed. And the investigationshows that different participants with different violation gains have thedissimilar risk preference.

Then, with the target of strategyoptimization, a differential game model between the safety authority andconstruction participants which have different types is proposed. The studyresult shows an optimization contral strategy should consider the probabilityof the authority’s behavior. A multi-game equilibrium is obtained and isvestified with stimulation and stable theory.

Finally, this thesis introduces the designand application of the regulatory mechanism in a specific case. The safetyinformation of the construction project could be got by using the specializedsafety checklist. An applicable safety regulatory instrument based ontheoretical analysis results is proposed, and the application effect provesthat a reasonable regulatory system will help to improve the level of safetycontrol during the procedure construction.

Key words：Construction Safety;Regulation Game; Control Strategy; Dynamic Analysis; Evolutionary StableStrategy; Multi-person Evolutionary Game