摘   要

长期以来，在建筑物使用过程中出现了质量问题而权益却得不到有效保障的问题，一直困扰着建筑物所有人。保监会、建设部和中国人保财险公司于2006年9月19日联合推出的旨在解决这一矛盾的建设工程质量保证保险试点两年多来，却几乎没有一个运作成功的案例。保险公司与各责任主体之间的风险分担不合理是导致该险种陷入困境的主要根源，因此在保险公司与各责任主体之间建立一个合理的风险分担机制是解决问题的关键。

本文从研究保险公司与各责任主体之间的风险分担着手，基于博弈论和委托—代理理论建立多阶段、多层次、多参与方的风险分担博弈模型。本文研究的最终目标是建立一套能使工程质量保证保险风险在各主要相关参与方之间合理分摊的风险分担机制，并对考虑地震风险时的工程质量保证保险制度加以改进。其主要内容包括现状分析、理论研究以及政策建议三个方面：

在现状分析方面，本文概括分析了国外工程质量保险制度，在此基础上，分析了工程质量缺陷的特点与分类，以及我国工程质量保证保险中各参与方的关系，并对“上海模式”、“福建模式”和“广东顺德模式”三种试点模式的优缺点进行了分析评价。

在理论研究方面，本文通过对保险公司缔约阶段所面临的风险进行分析基础上，基于博弈论和委托—代理理论建立了保险公司与承包商之间的风险分担激励契约模型，研究表明在单阶段时低风险的承包商更愿意努力工作以及偏好更高的保费优惠激励，并且当考虑承包商的内在动机时，对努力水平的激励效果比外在激励更有效。而存在两阶段动态风险分担时，保险公司可以通过观察竣工验收后一年内的质量缺陷损失来判断未来承保期可能的损失并判断承包商采取的最优努力水平，以决定最终保费。在此基础上，建立了保险公司与再保险公司的最优分保比例模型。当承包商与风险管理机构存在串谋寻租情况下，保险公司可以采取通过激励风险管理机构以及消除对承包商在偷懒和看不到信息之间的保费优惠收益差的防范策略。针对保险公司在开展工程质量保证保险业务时的不规范行为，提出了保险监管部门应采取提高监管效率以及加大惩罚力度的最优监管策略。本文通过分析在承保阶段由工程质量保证保险相关责任方可能导致的风险，建立了保险公司与相关责任方的博弈模型，保险公司将通过提高追偿概率和追偿额的方式来促使相关责任方努力工作。

在政策建议方面，本文根据各主要参与方的风险分担博弈研究结果，针对如何完善我国的工程质量保证保险制度提出了若干建议。此外，就目前工程质量保证保险不承保由于地震带来的房屋损失问题，提出从建筑综合地震保险制度的法律基础、建筑综合地震风险评估、精算与控制体系、建筑综合地震保险制度的财务及风险分散机制以及建筑综合地震保险理赔管理系统四个方面建立我国基于工程质量保证保险的建筑综合地震保险模式。

关键词：工程质量保证保险      多方博弈     风险分担      内在动机     地震保险

Abstract

Ithas been puzzled owner for long time that the rights can not be protected effectivelywhen the quality problems incurred in the course of using. In order to solvethe contradictions, the Ministry of Construction P.R.China (CIN), the ChinaInsurance Regulatory Commission (CIRC) and the People’s Insurance Company ofChina (PICC) started up trial of the Construction Quality Insurance System(CQI) on September 19, 2006. However, the CQI has been launched for about twoyears, there is still not a successful insurance case in China. Theunreasonable risksharing mechanism between the insuer and the responsibleparties of project is the root cause that the CQI is in the dilemma. Therefore,how to build a reasonable risksharing mechanism between the insuer and theresponsible parties of project is the key problem.

Thethesis commences risksharing among the insurer and each responsible entity,and sets up the model of risksharing with multiperiod, multilevel andmultiparticipant on the basis of the game and principalagent theory. Theobject of the study is to set up a mechanism of risksharing in which the riskof CQI could allocate reasonably among the each main participant, and to makeimprovement on the system of CQI considering the earthquake risks. Its maincontents included three parts such as status analysis, theoretical research andpolicy suggestions.

Fromthe status analysis, the thesis analyses the foreign engineering qualityinsurance system. On this basis, the thesis further analyses thecharacteristics and classification of engineering quality defects and therelations among each participant in the CQI and the advantages anddisadvantages of the "Shanghai model","Fujian model" and "GuangdongShunde model" in China.

Fromthe theoretical research, in this thesis the risk faced by the insurer in thecontracting phase is analysed and the risksharing incentive contract modelbetween the insurer and the contractor is set up by the game andprincipalagent theory based on the result. The conclusions show that moreefficient contractors are willing to choose a higher powered incentive contractand exert higher effort at the optimum with singlestage, and the intrinsicmotivation has more remarkable effect on exciting the effort level of contractorthan extrinsic incentive when the contractors’ intrinsic motivation isconsidered. Then the insurer can predict the loss distribution of next yearaccording to the construction quality problem occurs in 1 year after the finalacceptance, and can judge optimal effort level of the contractor and determinethe finalpremiumwith multistage dynamic risksharing. On this basis, this thesis gives out themodel of proportion of optimal reinsurance between the insurer and the reinsurer.When the existence of rentseeking in the contractor and risk managementinstitution, the insurer could take the prevention strategy that he incents riskmanagement institution and eliminates the difference of the premium benefitsprofit between the lazy behavior and the unobserved information of thecontractor. For the irregularities of insurer to carry out the CQI, this thesisputs forward the insurance supervision departments should take the optimalregulatory strategy with higher efficiency of supervision and heavier penalty.In this thesis, based on the analyzing on the risks of the underwriting stageof the responsible parties of the CQI, the game model of the insurer and theresponsible parties is set up. The insurer will enhance the probability andamount of recovery to promote the responsible parties to work hard .

Fromthe policy suggestions, according to the research results on the sharingriskamong main participants, the thesis put forwards some suggestions for how toimprove our CQI system. In addition, for the problem that the CQI does notcover the loss of housing as a result of the earthquake, the thesis proposes settingup the model of comprehensive earthquake insurance of building based on the CQIfrom four parts as follows: the legal foundation, the risk assessment,actuarial and control system, financial risk dispersion mechanism and claimmanagement system.

Key words：Construction quality insurance    multi-player game    risk-sharing intrinsic motivation    earthquake insurance